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SAD TIME: THOUGHTS ON JURISDICTIONALITY, 
THE LEGAL IMAGINATION, AND BOWLES V. 
RUSSELL 
Perry Dane∗ 
The courts, and in particular the Supreme Court, have made a mess of 
the doctrine of jurisdiction and the idea of jurisdictionality.  More specifi-
cally, they have made a mess of the relationship between time limits and the 
idea of jurisdictionality.  That much is clear.  The more interesting question, 
though, is why.  The answer to that question has profound and deeply 
evocative jurisprudential implications. 
Bowles v. Russell1 was the Supreme Court’s most recent foray into the 
problem of jurisdictionality.  Professor Scott Dodson’s short essay on the 
case2 thoughtfully identifies some of the majority opinion’s analytic defects 
and practical pitfalls.  He argues that the Court’s majority in Bowles was 
wrong to hold that the particular time limit contained in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2107(c) is jurisdictional.  I am not sure I agree, though that is not the main 
thrust of my own comments here.  More broadly, Professor Dodson acutely 
and usefully reminds all of us that time limits can be taken seriously, and 
even interpreted literally or peremptorily, without necessarily being labeled 
jurisdictional.  Here I agree completely, but would add, importantly, that 
time limits can also be jurisdictional without being interpreted literally and 
peremptorily, and that the court’s failure to see this is evocative of some-
thing odd and melancholy in our current legal culture. 
Much of my argument here appeared in an article called Jurisdictional-
ity, Time, and the Legal Imagination that I published long before Bowles 
was decided.3  I am not surprised that the Justices did not heed, and proba-
bly did not read, that article.  I am intrigued, though, why they did not get 
the key to the jurisdictionality problem right on their own when the basic 
outline of the problem (though, to be sure, not the solution in any particular 
instance) is really so simple. 
 ∗  Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law–Camden.  I am grateful to Allan Stein for his typically 
incisive comments on an earlier draft of this Comment. 
1  127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007) (link). 
2  Scott Dodson, Jurisdictionality and Bowles v. Russell, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 42 (2007), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/21/ (link). 
3  Perry Dane, Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1994). 
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I.  
At the risk of rehashing the obvious, let’s begin at the beginning: Our 
adversarial system of adjudication leaves most legal issues and questions in 
the hands of the parties.  Parties can waive or stipulate most questions of 
law or fact.  They can also lose, by delay or procedural default, the oppor-
tunity to raise most of the questions they haven’t explicitly waived or stipu-
lated.  Some legal rules and principles, however, are said to go to the very 
power or authority of the court, and they are not in the hands of the parties.  
We call these rules and principles “jurisdictional.” 
Distinguishing jurisdictional from nonjurisdictional questions is not 
always easy.  I teach a course, using cases and materials I have collected, 
devoted solely to the doctrines of jurisdictionality and their place in the le-
gal culture.4  We spend several weeks in the second half of that course ex-
amining cases in which courts have tried to decide whether particular legal 
rules are jurisdictional or not.  These cases suggest a potpourri of possible 
criteria, many in tension with each other, but no single overarching theory 
or test.  All in all, Justice Holmes seems to have had it right, even if vacu-
ously right, when he wrote that “[w]hether a given statute is intended sim-
ply to . . . define the duty of the court, or is meant to limit its power, is a 
question of [both] construction and common sense.”5  That is to say, legis-
latures get to choose which legal rules are jurisdictional and which are not, 
and yet, at the same time, some legal rules just seem to fit more comforta-
bly in the jurisdictional basket than others. 
In any event, if a given legal rule is properly called jurisdictional, cer-
tain consequences follow.  For example: parties cannot waive jurisdictional 
rules,6 nor can they stipulate the existence of jurisdiction.7  Courts have a 
duty to consider jurisdictional questions sua sponte at any point in the 
course of litigation, even if the parties do not raise them, and they have no 
discretion simply to excuse or forgive failures of jurisdiction.8  The exis-
 
4  For the course description, see http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/cgi-bin/course-description.cgi?class=646 
(link). 
5  Fauntelroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 235 (1908) (link). 
6  See, e.g., Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 316 (2006) (link); Mansfield, C. & L. M. Ry. 
Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382, (1884) (link); Mennen Co. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 287, 294 
n.9 (3d Cir. 1998). 
7  See, e.g., California v. La Rue, 409 U.S. 109, 112 n.3 (1972) (link).  But cf. Weaver v. Hollywood 
Casino-Aurora, Inc., 255 F.3d 379, 384–85 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that a court has no obligation to in-
quire into parties’ stipulation of facts necessary to jurisdiction). 
8  See, e.g., Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 593 (2004) (link) (“[B]y 
whatever route a case arrives in federal court, it is the obligation of both district court and counsel to be 
alert to jurisdictional requirements.”); Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) 
(link) (“[E]very federal appellate court has a special obligation to ‘satisfy itself not only of its own juris-
diction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review,’ even though the parties are prepared 
to concede it.”) (quoting Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934); Greenbriar Hills Country Club 
v. Dir. of Revenue, 47 S.W. 3d 346, 350 (Mo. 2001) (“This Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and it 
has a duty to determine the question of its jurisdiction sua sponte.”). 
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tence of jurisdiction must, at least usually,9 be considered before nonjuris-
dictional questions are decided.  Dismissals for lack of jurisdiction are not 
claim-preclusive,10 though they can be issue-preclusive on the jurisdictional 
question itself.11  Certain avenues might be available to police abuses of ju-
risdictional limits that might not be available to correct mere errors of law.12 
These two questions—whether a legal rule is jurisdictional, and what 
follows if it is—are not sealed off from each other.  In particular, one con-
sideration in deciding whether a legal rule is jurisdictional might be whether 
it is the sort of rule to which the consequences of jurisdictionality should at-
tach.  Indeed, my course on jurisdiction considers the consequences of ju-
risdictionality before moving on to the problem of telling which rules are 
jurisdictional in the first place, much as many contracts casebooks cover the 
topic of remedies before they discuss formation and breach.  Nevertheless, a 
fundamental postulate of the idea of jurisdiction, as a classical feature of 
our legal culture, is that jurisdictionality is more than just a label for certain 
consequences.  If a rule is jurisdictional, it really does implicate the author-
ity of a court; it really is, in Justice Holmes’s words, a limit on a court’s 
“power” and not only a statement of its “duty.” 
More fundamentally, the notion of jurisdictionality suggests that the 
authority of courts is not grounded merely in their identity as courts, but in 
a set of discrete, legally delimited, grants of power, beyond whose bounds a 
judge in a robe might almost as well be any common person on the street. 
What does all this have to do with the doctrine of “jurisdictional time 
limits”?  Very little.  To be sure, if a rule setting out a time limit is jurisdic-
tional, the usual consequences follow: it cannot be waived by the opposing 
party or by the court, it can be raised at any point in the litigation, it should 
be raised sua sponte by the court, and so on.  Moreover, a dismissal based 
on failure to comply with a jurisdictional time limit is not claim-preclusive, 
 
9  See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (link) (rejecting recourse to doc-
trine of “hypothetical jurisdiction”).  But cf., e.g., Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 127 
S. Ct. 1184 (2007) (link) (allowing dismissal for forum non conveniens even though challenges to sub-
ject-matter and personal jurisdiction had not been definitively settled).  The problem posed in Sinochem 
raises an important conceptual puzzle of its own, but it is not one that I can deal with here. 
10  See, e.g., Goldsmith v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 987 F.2d 1064, 1068–69 (4th Cir. 
1993); By-Prod Corp. v. Armen-Berry Co., 668 F.2d 956, 962 (7th Cir. 1982). 
11  For two classic modern cases supporting this proposition, though with different understandings of 
the exact reach of issue-preclusion in the wake of dismissals for lack of jurisdictions, see Dozier v. Ford 
Motor Co., 702 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  See also Mann v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, 
Inc., 488 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1973). 
12  See, e.g., In re James, 940 F.2d 46, 52 (3d Cir. 1991) (federal bankruptcy court can “vacate” state 
court judgment when the state court proceedings were void ab initio); PAUL P. CRAIG, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW 818 (4th ed. 1999) (discussing courts’ “jurisdictional control” of administrative agencies under 
British administrative law); David McCord, Visions of Habeas, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REV. 735, 746 (empha-
sizing that for much of the nineteenth century, “the only legitimate sphere of operation of the writ [of 
habeas corpus] in the context of imprisonment pursuant to a judicial directive was if the sentencing court 
lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter or the person of the defendant.”). 
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although this will be of little practical consequence unless there happens to 
be another tribunal, proceeding, or legal theory to which the fatal time limit 
does not apply. 
But the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits asserts more than any of 
this.  It also holds that if a time limit is jurisdictional, it should be applied 
literally and mercilessly.  In my Jurisdictionality article,13 I trace the evolu-
tion of this idea from the confluence of two pieces of doctrinal history.  
First, courts have long interpreted certain species of time limits more 
strictly than others, for various historical and conceptual reasons, but they at 
some point began to attach labels such as “mandatory and jurisdictional” or 
just plain “jurisdictional” to those strictly-interpreted time limits.  Second, 
courts have long interpreted certain time limits as “jurisdictional,” but at 
some point their efforts to think carefully and specifically through what that 
might mean “began to overflow into a more general, loosely defined notion 
of literal and strict application.”14 
Despite these historical developments, however, the notion that juris-
dictional time limits admit no leniency is simply a mistake.  It confuses the 
consequences that should flow if a rule of law is jurisdictional with the 
meaning or content of the rule itself.  Or to put it another way: it treats as 
mandatory not only the jurisdictional rule itself, but also one particular, lit-
eral, and draconian interpretation of that rule.  This move is not only en-
tirely unnecessary, it is belied by the treatment of jurisdictional questions in 
other, less arithmetical, contexts.  Thus, for example, the “final judgment” 
rule governing review of state court judgments in the United States Su-
preme Court is a jurisdictional requirement, but the Court has been willing 
to allow review in various situations in which a literal “final judgment” is 
not present.15  Similarly, the principle requiring federal courts not to hear 
controversies that have become moot is a jurisdictional rule drawn from the 
Constitution itself, but the Court has been willing to treat as justiciable cer-
tain categories of controversies, including those that are “capable of repeti-
tion, yet evading review.”16 
To see the error in the received doctrine of jurisdictional time limits, 
consider Teague v. Commissioner of Customs.17  In Teague, the Supreme 
Court refused to hear a petition for certiorari that, apparently because of 
“snowstorms making the transportation of the mails impossible,”18 had been 
delivered to the Court after the ninety-day period set out by statute.  In a 
 
13  Dane, supra note 3, at 99–112. 
14  Dane, supra note 3, at 107. 
15  The classic treatment of this issue appears in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 
477–85 (1975) (link) (setting out four categories of cases in which Court has treated a state court deci-
sion as a “final judgment” even though additional proceedings were contemplated in the state courts). 
16  See, e.g., FEC v. Wisc. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007) (link); Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stu-
art, 427 U.S. 539, 546–47 (1976) (link). 
17  394 U.S. 977 (1969) (link). 
18  Id. at 982. 
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dissent from the denial of certiorari, Justice Hugo Black made this emi-
nently simple observation: 
It is suggested by the Solicitor General, on behalf of respondents here, that this 
statute is “jurisdictional,” and that we must follow it.  I agree, of course, that 
we should follow the statute.  But we must first determine what the statute 
means. . . .  
. . .  
. . . [T]he language of the statute itself [does not] dictate the Court’s result.  
The statute does not say explicitly that the time limitation may be inapplicable 
under certain extenuating circumstances, but it also does not say that the time 
limit must be ruthlessly applied in every conceivable situation, without regard 
to hardships involved or extenuating circumstances present.  The Court there-
fore must decide what is the more sensible interpretation of the statute.19 
Jurisdictionality defended Justice Black’s argument at great length.  
Among other issues, I discussed the possibility that, in the context of time 
limits, the adjective “jurisdictional” just means draconian or literal.  This 
solution, however linguistically annoying and confusing, would at least be 
conceptually coherent.  Unfortunately, though, most courts have not been 
brave enough to cut the knot.  To the contrary, they have routinely con-
cluded that if a time limit is “jurisdictional” for other purposes, it must be 
“jurisdictional” in the sense of being interpreted literally, and that, if it is 
“jurisdictional” in the sense of being interpreted literally, it must be “juris-
dictional” for other purposes.20  Since that article, several Supreme Court 
opinions have suggested that it “is a word of many, too many meanings,”21 
and that courts have sometimes been “less than meticulous” in loosely using 
the term just to refer to “nonextendable” or “emphatic” time prescriptions.22  
For reasons that I discuss, below, however, these refreshing admissions did 
not go far enough to untangle the conceptual muddle of the received wis-
dom on jurisdictional time limits. 
As noted at the start of these comments, Professor Dodson helps the 
process of conceptual clarification along significantly by emphasizing that 
time limits might be draconian without necessarily being jurisdictional.23  
But, as Justice Black recognized, the mirror image of and complement to 
 
19  Id. at 982–83. 
20  See, e.g., Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982) (link); Nilsen v. City of 
Moss Point, 701 F.2d 556, 562 (5th Cir. 1983).  For a more complete discussion, see Dane, supra note 3, 
at 51–60.  As I point out in that article, some judges have occasionally suggested a more purely semantic 
understanding of the idea of “jurisdictional time limits.”  Ironically, one of those judges was Justice 
Thomas, the author of the majority opinion in Bowles, writing when he was still a federal court of ap-
peals judge, in Cross-Sound Ferry Servs., Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 934 F.2d 327, 340–41 
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (Thomas, J., concurring in part). 
21  Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (link). 
22  Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004) (link). 
23  Dodson, supra note 2, at 46–48.  
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Professor Dodson’s insight is equally true and important: time limits can be 
jurisdictional without necessarily being draconian. 
II.  
If time limits can indeed be jurisdictional without necessarily being 
draconian, that suggests that the jurisdictionality of a time limit and its pre-
cise strictness need to be approached as distinct issues.  More specifically, 
to really nail the matter down right a case such as Bowles v. Russell should 
actually be analyzed in three careful and distinct steps. 
The first step is to decide whether the 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) specifica-
tion of a fourteen-day outer bound on extensions of time to appeal is a “ju-
risdictional” provision, in the sense of limiting judicial power.  I will have 
more to say about this below, but for now, assume that the fourteen-day 
provision is jurisdictional. 
The second step, then, is to decide whether the fourteen-day provision 
could even colorably be read, consistent with its jurisdictional character, as 
allowing a federal court of appeals to hear Keith Bowles’s appeal even 
though it was submitted on February 26, 2004—two days after the fourteen 
days specified in the statute but before the due date of February 27, 2004 
that the District Court had (presumably mistakenly) specified in its order.  
Here, I admit to being of two minds. 
On the one hand, if we take the idea of jurisdiction seriously, it would 
be inconsistent with the jurisdictional character of the fourteen-day provi-
sion to read into it simple discretion to extend the outer bound from four-
teen to seventeen days.  Separately, but equally important, while Justice 
Black in Teague could plausibly read the time limit he was interpreting to 
include an implicit exception for Acts of God, no similar extenuating cir-
cumstance could justify the District Court’s order in Bowles. 
On the other hand, it might be better to focus not on the District 
Court’s authority to grant Bowles a seventeen-day extension (it had none), 
but on the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to hear the appeal in the 
wake of the District Court’s misstep.  Keith Bowles, after all, was the vic-
tim of a “bait and switch.”24  This particular ill turn seems to have been ac-
cidental.  But imagine, for example, that a malicious District Judge had 
physically prevented an attorney from filing an appeal within the number of 
days set out in the statute.  In that case, Justice Black would certainly argue 
that the statute, even if jurisdictional, could coherently be read to allow an 
appeal filed beyond the literal number of days.  That is to say, while the 
District Court’s action could not be justified or excused, it could constitute 
a fact in the world—like a snowstorm—that might excuse a late filing of the 
appeal on a reasonable reading of the statute itself.  The relevant question, 
then, is whether the same might even plausibly be said when a judge mis-
 
24  Bowles, 127 S.Ct. at 2367 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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takenly calculates the end-date of an extension and an attorney fails to 
check the judge’s arithmetic (or does not know he should).  This would be a 
longer stretch, to be sure, but maybe not so much of a stretch as to break 
faith with the idea of jurisdiction.  In any event, it bears emphasis that even 
a liberal reading of § 2107(c) could not, consistent with the jurisdictional 
character of the rule, authorize a judge just to ignore the literal rule as a 
matter of grace.25  Moreover, even such a liberal reading would not affect 
the other usual incidents of the rule’s jurisdictional character. 
As noted, I am conflicted whether a forgiving reading of § 2107(c) is 
actually conceptually available under the peculiar circumstances of Bowles.  
Even if it is, though, that still leaves the third step in the analysis, which is 
to decide whether such a reading would actually be correct.  This, it seems 
to me, is a fairly ordinary question of statutory interpretation, to which the 
usual tools of the trade easily apply.  For purposes of this short comment, 
though, I want, with regard to this question, to remain entirely agnostic. 
III.  
The problem in Justice Thomas’s majority opinion in Bowles, of 
course, is that he conflated these three steps into one.  He simply assumed, 
in line with the received doctrine of jurisdictional time limits, that if a rule 
containing a time limit is jurisdictional, that rule can only be read literally 
and unforgivingly.  The dissent, though, does not do a much better job of 
disentangling the problem.  Justice Souter protests that it was “intolerable 
for the judicial system to treat” Keith Bowles as it did.26  Rather than sug-
gesting that even a jurisdictional time limit might not apply literally in the 
face of such a “bait and switch,” however, Justice Souter implicitly accepts 
the received wisdom that this would be impossible, and must resort instead 
to arguing that the time limit could not be jurisdictional in the first place. 
The key here is Justice Souter’s explanation that “if a limit is taken to 
be jurisdictional, waiver becomes impossible, meritorious excuse irrelevant 
(unless the statute so provides), and sua sponte consideration in the courts 
of appeals mandatory.”27  Souter’s recitation of these three incidents of ju-
risdictionality is exactly correct in principle, but he unnecessarily concedes, 
even in the face of a result he finds absurd and cruel, that if a statute “pro-
vides” for “meritorious excuse,” it must do so literally and explicitly.  This 
axiom runs counter to how courts treat a wide variety of other jurisdictional 
norms, and also runs counter to how courts sometimes read jurisdictional 
 
25  For that matter, even under circumstances similar to those in Bowles, a more liberal reading of the 
statute would probably be inherently self-limiting, in that the Bowles case itself would put attorneys on 
notice that they should check the judge’s arithmetic.  “Fool me once shame on you; fool me twice shame 
on me.” 
26  Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2367 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
27  Id. at 2368. 
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time limits themselves before they fell into, or when they managed to see 
beyond, the rut of the received doctrine. 
Justice Souter, of course, has a larger agenda in mind.  He chides the 
majority for not following the lead of recent cases such as Kontrick v. Ry-
an28 and Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,29 that tried to prune the conceptual mud-
dle of jurisdictionality by sharply restricting the universe of rules properly 
called “jurisdictional.”  According to this new wisdom, courts should gen-
erally use “the label ‘jurisdictional’ not for claim-processing rules [such as 
time limits], but only for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling 
within a court’s adjudicatory authority.”30  There are at least three serious 
problems, however, with this effort at conceptual reform. 
First, Justice Souter’s own categories are not conceptually straightfor-
ward.  For example, a naïve reading of the term “subject-matter jurisdic-
tion” might restrict it to rules defining the “subjects” or topics appropriate 
to a given court.  Indeed, many early cases explicitly distinguished between 
jurisdiction grounded in “the subject-matter of the suit” and jurisdiction 
grounded, as in diversity cases, in “the character of the parties.”31  Yet Jus-
tice Souter would probably accept the ordinary but actually quite arbitrary 
assimilation of issues such as diversity,32 as well as questions such as stand-
ing and mootness,33 into “subject matter jurisdiction.”  He might even agree 
that more technical requirements such as the final judgment rule34 are mat-
ters of “subject-matter jurisdiction.”  Thus, where to draw the conceptual 
line between “subject-matter” jurisdiction, as a coherent conceptual cate-
gory, and mere “claim processing” might be harder than Justice Souter 
thinks.35 
 
28  540 U.S. 443 (2004). 
29  546 U.S. 500 (2006). 
30  Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455. 
31  See McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Walthers, 134 U.S. 41, 43 (1890) (link); Case of Sew-
ing Mach. Cos., 85 U.S. 553 (1874) (link). 
32  See, e.g., Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 318 (2006); Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 
519 U.S. 61, 73 (1996) (link). 
33  See, e.g., St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2007); 
KH Outdoor, L.L.C. v. Clay County, 482 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 2007). 
34  See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, 511 U.S. 863, 869 n.3 (1994) (link). 
35  Part of the problem is, again, semantic.  Our legal culture has generally habituated us to think that 
there are, by definition, two types of jurisdictional questions—subject-matter jurisdiction and personal 
jurisdiction—so that any jurisdictional question that is not a matter of personal jurisdiction is, by default, 
a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction.  But we are also tempted to think, as Justice Souter does, that the 
category of “subject-matter jurisdiction” has independent conceptual meaning.  In fact, conceptual clar-
ity would probably be advanced if we just rejected the assumption that there are two, and only two, fun-
damental categories of jurisdictional questions.  The law of international tribunals, for example, posits 
three and sometimes four categories: subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, temporal jurisdic-
tion, and (often) territorial jurisdiction.  See, e.g., CHITTHARANJAN F. AMERASINGHE, JURISDICTION OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 53 (2d ed. 2003); JEROME B ELKIND, NON-APPEARANCE BEFORE THE 
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Second, as Justice Souter admits, the relevant legislator is entitled to 
designate virtually any legal rule as “jurisdictional,” including so-called 
“claim-processing rules.”36  Thus, the Court’s effort to “clean up [its] lan-
guage”37 is at best a canon of construction, not a matter of conceptual or 
jurisprudential necessity.  And if Justice Souter is operating in the realm of 
statutory construction rather than conceptual necessity, it might be worth 
considering another important canon of construction: that Congress is pre-
sumed to understand statutes against the background of prior judicial inter-
pretations of similar statutes and statutory language.  Thus, if courts have, 
wisely or not, traditionally interpreted time limits on appeal as jurisdic-
tional, it might require an explicit congressional repudiation of that under-
standing to undo it.38 
Third, and most important, Justice Souter’s effort to weed out exces-
sive or misleading use of the term “jurisdictional” is in tension with the 
rich, varied, widespread, and venerable traditions surrounding jurisdictional 
ascriptions.  Jurisdictionality, as a concept, does not only figure in the prac-
tice of federal courts.  It is also a commonplace in state courts,39 and in the 
courts of other common law jurisdictions,40 and has a history going back 
many hundreds of years.41  And, as I suggested at the start of this comment, 
if one examines that rich tapestry of doctrine and jurisprudence (in the dou-
ble sense of the word as both case law and legal theory), it becomes clear 
                                                                                                                           
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: FUNCTIONAL AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 107 (1984); Susan W. 
Tiefenbrun, The Role of the World Court in Settling International Disputes: A Recent Assessment, 20 
LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1997).  The category of temporal jurisdiction (ratione tempo-
ris), I should add, bears no direct relation to our problem of jurisdictional time limits.  Rather, it refers to 
limits on a court’s competence to adjudicate events that occurred before or after certain points in time; it 
is particularly germane, for example, to controversies regarding retroactivity. 
36  Bowles v. Russell, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 2369 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
37  Id. at 2367. 
38  A careful reader might ask, of course, whether that same presumption of congressional acquies-
cence in judicial interpretations should not counsel against my suggestion that the Court might treat 
some time limits as jurisdictional but not necessarily draconian.  This is a fair question, but there are 
several plausible arguments the other way.  First, as even Justice Thomas admits, there is long-standing 
precedent, even with regard to jurisdictional statutes, for excusing untimely filings in the face of “unique 
circumstances.” Id. at 2366.  Second, if Justice Souter is correct that the majority’s draconian result is 
inequitable and “strange,” id. at 2371, n. 8 (Souter, J., dissenting), that would bring yet another canon of 
construction into play: that statutes should, if possible, not be read to produce “absurd” and “unjust” re-
sults.  See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 428–29 (1998) (link); Church of Holy Trin-
ity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (link). 
39  I could cite thousands of cases, of course, but four drawn from the materials in my course are 
Head v. Caddo Hills Sch. Dist., 745 S.W.2d 595 (Ark. 1988); Fogg v. Macaluso, 892 P.2d 271, 278–81 
(Colo. 1995) (Scott, J., concurring in the result); Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. City of New Lon-
don, 925 A.2d 292, 308–11 (Conn. 2007); Duvall v. Duvall, 80 So. 2d 752, 753–56 (Miss. 1955). 
40  See, e.g., Bodruddaza v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs 
(2007) 234 A.L.R. 114 (Austl.); Mills v. The Queen [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863 (Can.); In re Racal Communi-
cations, Ltd. (1981) A.C. 374 (U.K. H.L.). 
41  For a comprehensive, if obviously dated, survey of the full range of doctrines relating to the idea 
of jurisdictionality, and their history, see WILLIAM F. BAILEY, THE LAW OF JURISDICTION (1899). 
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very quickly that, while there might be any number of overlapping and oc-
casionally contradictory rules of thumb to distinguish jurisdictional from 
nonjurisdictional rules, they are weak generalizations at best.  Jurisdictional 
issues are usually separate from, and prior to, the existence of a cause of ac-
tion or a right to relief.42  But sometimes they come close together or even 
merge.43  In one particularly narrow formulation, jurisdictional issues have 
been said to go only to whether “a case is brought in the court which has the 
authority and power to determine the type of action at issue” rather than to 
whether the court should be hearing a particular instance of that type of ac-
tion.44  But, most jurisdictional litigation is precisely about specific in-
stances rather than general types.  Jurisdictional issues are often said to 
arise by definition with respect to statutes that create rights not available at 
common law.45  But this generalization, if applied to federal courts, would 
render almost every question jurisdictional.  Jurisdictional requirements are 
sometimes said to be a subset of procedural requirements, as opposed to 
substantive rules.46  But in some specific contexts, courts have identified a 
rule as jurisdictional because it is “substantive” rather than merely “proce-
dural.”47  Jurisdictional issues usually arise at the very threshold of litiga-
tion, but some jurisdictional questions arise later.48  Finally, jurisdictional 
 
42  See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154–55 (1990) (link) (petitioner must establish ju-
risdictional standing before federal court can consider merits of his legal claim, and the threshold inquiry 
into standing does not depend on merits of petitoner’s substantive arguments); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 
678, 682 (1946) (link) (“Jurisdiction . . . is not defeated . . . by the possibility that the averments might 
fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover.”); Fauntelroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 
230, 234–35 (1908) (“No doubt it sometimes may be difficult to decide whether certain words in a stat-
ute are directed to jurisdiction or to merits, but the distinction between the two is plain.”). 
43  See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 487 n.13 (1975) (conceding that decid-
ing whether a case fits one of the qualifications to the final judgment rule can involve “consideration of 
the merits in determining jurisdiction” but “only to the extent of determining that the issue is substan-
tial”); The Careau Group v. Luberski, 940 F.2d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 1991) (“In this case, the jurisdic-
tional issue is the merits.”); Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco, Inc., 610 P.2d 1307, 1309–1313 (Utah 1980) 
(noting that existence of personal jurisdiction in long-arm suit alleging breach of contract can depend, in 
the absence of general jurisdiction, on whether parties actually entered into a contract). 
44  See, e.g., Washington v. Whitaker, 451 S.E.2d 894, 898 (S.C. 1994). 
45  See, e.g., Bullock v. Amoco Production Co., 608 S.W.2d 899, 901 (Tex. 1980) (“These statutes 
created a right not existing at common law and prescribed a remedy to enforce the right.  Thus, the 
courts . . . [only have jurisdiction according to the rules] provided by the statute which created the 
right.”). 
46  See, e.g., Emmon v. Dinelli, 133 N.E.2d 56, 62–63 (Ill. 1956) (explaining that because adoption 
statute is in derogation of the common law, its procedural requirements are jurisdictional, but this prin-
ciple does not extend to the substantive requirements of the law). 
47  See, e.g., Ecker v. Town of West Hartford, 530 A.2d 1056, 1062 (Conn. 1987) (stating that when 
a time limitation “is a substantive element of the right itself,” it is “jurisdictional and cannot be 
waived”). 
48  The classic formulation of this insight is found in Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 282–83 
(1876) (link) (Recognizing that ordinarily, “where a court has once acquired jurisdiction, it has a right to 
decide every question which arises in the cause.”  But a court acts outside its jurisdiction, and its judg-
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rules usually reflect, in Professor Dodson’s words, “structural values” rather 
than litigant-centered values.  But particular caution is warranted here, for it 
is often precisely in the history of jurisdictional ascription that we can dis-
cern whether structural values are at stake in the first place.49 
It turns out, then, that both the majority and the dissent in Bowles fail 
to reason their way out of the legal and practical dilemma posed by strict 
time limits under conditions of unusual stress.  And as suggested earlier, 
this shared failure is much more interesting than the particular questions of 
interpretation and application raised by the case.  In his essay, Professor 
Dodson observes that Bowles was a case “watched primarily by procedure 
geeks.”50  But it might well be such apparently technical and low-stakes 
cases that can best reveal, in their most pristine form, some deep truths 
about the current state of the legal culture. 
Both the majority and the dissent in Bowles display a parallel, and 
deeply consequential, reluctance to embrace the potential of the legal 
imagination.  The majority seems to believe that the only way to respect the 
importance of jurisdiction and jurisdictionality is to construe jurisdictional 
rules literally and mercilessly.51  Indeed, to reach its conclusion, the Court 
goes so far as to reject prior decisions that at least opened the door to excus-
ing untimely filings in limited cases involving “unique circumstances.”52  
This still strikes me as reflecting a “neurotic turn” in legal thought,53 a fail-
ure—born of ambivalence and doubt about the very project of legal inter-
pretation—to understand that true respect for legal ideas (such as 
jurisdictionality) and legal enactments (such as section 2107(c)) would re-
quire plumbing their meaning rather than settling for the literal.  As sug-
gested earlier, this sort of neurosis appears most starkly in “geeky” corners 
of the law such as the interpretation of time limits on appeal, but it is also 
apparent and profoundly consequential in the flight from the legal imagina-
tion and genuine legal reasoning that dominates constitutional law’s current 
obsession with various forms of “originalism.”54 
The dissent, meanwhile, buys into the majority’s equation of “jurisdic-
tional” with “literal,” but also raises the stakes in trying to chop away at the 
rich and complicated tradition of the idea of jurisdiction in American law.  
                                                                                                                           
ment can be collaterally attacked, if it “transcend[s] the power conferred by the law” by departing from 
“established modes of procedure.”) 
49  For a particularly powerful, and conceptually and historically rich, illustration of this point, see 
Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The Jurisdictional Heritage of the Grand Jury Clause, 91 MINN. L. REV. 398 
(2006) (link). 
50  Dodson, supra note 2, at 42. 
51  Bowles v. Russell, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 2366–67 (2007). 
52  Id. at 2366. 
53  Dane, supra note 3, at 132. 
54  Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 173–75 (1996); Robert W. 
Bennett, The Mission of Moral Reasoning in Constitutional Law, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 647, 648–49 
(1985). 
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In some sense, the dissent reveals a mistrust of the basic notion of jurisdic-
tionality.  Stuck with the word, though, it wants to understand it through the 
limited lens provided by the standard federal courts course in American law 
schools.  It thus cannot appreciate, for example, the long tradition, in both 
federal and state jurisprudence, that time limits on appeal are considered ju-
risdictional because the authority of appellate courts, as distinguished from 
courts of general jurisdiction, is shaped in large part by the various proce-
dural prerequisites governing access to those courts.  Again, this failure to 
draw connections and to investigate the roots of legal ideas is apparent in 
more consequential form elsewhere, including constitutional law. 
The immediate consequences of Bowles v. Russell will probably be 
fairly minimal.  They might even be, on the whole, salutary to the extent 
that judges and lawyers will be more careful in their arithmetic.  But the 
case is still very sad, and should make those of who care about the law and 
distinctively legal ideas more than a little regretful about shallow debates 
and lost opportunities. 
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